RFC5361 日本語訳

5361 A Document Format for Requesting Consent. G. Camarillo. October 2008. (Format: TXT=28256 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
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Network Working Group                                       G. Camarillo
Request for Comments: 5361                                      Ericsson
Category: Standards Track                                   October 2008

Network Working Group G. Camarillo Request for Comments: 5361 Ericsson Category: Standards Track October 2008

                A Document Format for Requesting Consent

A Document Format for Requesting Consent

Status of This Memo

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

Abstract

   This document defines an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format for
   a permission document used to request consent.  A permission document
   written in this format is used by a relay to request a specific
   recipient permission to perform a particular routing translation.

This document defines an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format for a permission document used to request consent. A permission document written in this format is used by a relay to request a specific recipient permission to perform a particular routing translation.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Definitions and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   3.  Permission Document Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       3.1.1.  Recipient Condition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       3.1.2.  Identity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       3.1.3.  Target Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.4.  Validity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.1.5.  Sphere Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.1.  Translation Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Example Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.1.  XML Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.2.  XML Schema Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Permission Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1.1. Recipient Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1.2. Identity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.3. Target Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.4. Validity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.5. Sphere Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.1. Translation Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Example Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. XML Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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1.  Introduction

1. Introduction

   The framework for consent-based communications in the Session
   Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC5360] identifies the need for a format
   to create permission documents.  Such permission documents are used
   by SIP [RFC3261] relays to request permission to perform
   translations.  A relay is defined as any SIP server, be it a proxy,
   B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some hybrid, which receives a
   request and translates the Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs
   to which it then delivers a request.

The framework for consent-based communications in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC5360] identifies the need for a format to create permission documents. Such permission documents are used by SIP [RFC3261] relays to request permission to perform translations. A relay is defined as any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some hybrid, which receives a request and translates the Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs to which it then delivers a request.

   The format for permission documents specified in this document is
   based on Common Policy [RFC4745], an XML document format for
   expressing privacy preferences.

The format for permission documents specified in this document is based on Common Policy [RFC4745], an XML document format for expressing privacy preferences.

2.  Definitions and Terminology

2. Definitions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This document uses the terms defined in [RFC5360].  For completeness,
   these terms are repeated here.  Figure 1 of [RFC5360] shows the
   relationship between target and recipient URIs in a translation
   operation.

This document uses the terms defined in [RFC5360]. For completeness, these terms are repeated here. Figure 1 of [RFC5360] shows the relationship between target and recipient URIs in a translation operation.

   Recipient URI:

Recipient URI:

      The Request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an entity (e.g., a
      user agent or a proxy).  The sending of such request can have been
      the result of a translation operation.

The Request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an entity (e.g., a user agent or a proxy). The sending of such request can have been the result of a translation operation.

   Relay:

Relay:

      Any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or
      some hybrid, that receives a request, translates its Request-URI
      into one or more next-hop URIs (i.e., recipient URIs), and
      delivers the request to those URIs.

Any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some hybrid, that receives a request, translates its Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs (i.e., recipient URIs), and delivers the request to those URIs.

   Target URI:

Target URI:

      The Request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to a relay
      that will perform a translation operation.

The Request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to a relay that will perform a translation operation.

   Translation logic:

Translation logic:

      The logic that defines a translation operation at a relay.  This
      logic includes the translation's target and recipient URIs.

The logic that defines a translation operation at a relay. This logic includes the translation's target and recipient URIs.

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   Translation operation:

Translation operation:

      Operation by which a relay translates the Request-URI of an
      incoming request (i.e., the target URI) into one or more URIs
      (i.e., recipient URIs) that are used as the Request-URIs of one or
      more outgoing requests.

Operation by which a relay translates the Request-URI of an incoming request (i.e., the target URI) into one or more URIs (i.e., recipient URIs) that are used as the Request-URIs of one or more outgoing requests.

3.  Permission Document Structure

3. Permission Document Structure

   A permission document is an XML document, formatted according to the
   schema defined in [RFC4745].  Permission documents inherit the MIME
   type of common policy documents, 'application/auth-policy+xml'.  As
   described in [RFC4745], this type of document is composed of three
   parts: conditions, actions, and transformations.

A permission document is an XML document, formatted according to the schema defined in [RFC4745]. Permission documents inherit the MIME type of common policy documents, 'application/auth-policy+xml'. As described in [RFC4745], this type of document is composed of three parts: conditions, actions, and transformations.

   This section defines the new conditions and actions defined by this
   specification.  This specification does not define any new
   transformation.

This section defines the new conditions and actions defined by this specification. This specification does not define any new transformation.

3.1.  Conditions

3.1. Conditions

   The conditions in a permission document are a set of expressions,
   each of which evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE.  Note that, as
   discussed in [RFC4745], a permission document applies to a
   translation if all the expressions in its conditions part evaluate to
   TRUE.

The conditions in a permission document are a set of expressions, each of which evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. Note that, as discussed in [RFC4745], a permission document applies to a translation if all the expressions in its conditions part evaluate to TRUE.

3.1.1.  Recipient Condition

3.1.1. Recipient Condition

   The recipient condition is matched against the recipient URI of a
   translation.  Recipient conditions can contain the same elements and
   attributes as identity conditions.

The recipient condition is matched against the recipient URI of a translation. Recipient conditions can contain the same elements and attributes as identity conditions.

   When performing a translation, a relay matches the recipient
   condition of the permission document that was used to request
   permission for that translation against the destination URI of the
   outgoing request.  When receiving a request granting or denying
   permissions (e.g., a SIP PUBLISH request as described in [RFC5360]),
   the relay matches the recipient condition of the permission document
   that was used to request permission against the identity of the
   entity granting or denying permissions (i.e., the sender of the
   PUBLISH request).  If there is a match, the recipient condition
   evaluates to TRUE.  Otherwise, the recipient condition evaluates to
   FALSE.

When performing a translation, a relay matches the recipient condition of the permission document that was used to request permission for that translation against the destination URI of the outgoing request. When receiving a request granting or denying permissions (e.g., a SIP PUBLISH request as described in [RFC5360]), the relay matches the recipient condition of the permission document that was used to request permission against the identity of the entity granting or denying permissions (i.e., the sender of the PUBLISH request). If there is a match, the recipient condition evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the recipient condition evaluates to FALSE.

   Since only authenticated identities can be matched, this section
   defines acceptable means of authentication, which are in line with
   those described in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC5360].

Since only authenticated identities can be matched, this section defines acceptable means of authentication, which are in line with those described in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC5360].

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   The 'id' attribute in the elements <one> and <except> MUST contain a
   scheme when these elements appear in a permission document.

The 'id' attribute in the elements <one> and <except> MUST contain a scheme when these elements appear in a permission document.

   When used with SIP, a recipient granting or denying a relay
   permissions is considered authenticated if one of the following
   techniques is used:

When used with SIP, a recipient granting or denying a relay permissions is considered authenticated if one of the following techniques is used:

   SIP Identity  [RFC4474], as described in Section 5.6.1.1 of
      [RFC5360].  For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
      SIP Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the PUBLISH
      request is equal to the SIP URI in the From header field of the
      request, assuming that the signature in the Identity header field
      has been validated.

SIP Identity [RFC4474], as described in Section 5.6.1.1 of [RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the SIP Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the PUBLISH request is equal to the SIP URI in the From header field of the request, assuming that the signature in the Identity header field has been validated.

   P-Asserted-Identity  [RFC3325] (which can only be used in closed
      network environments) as described in Section 5.6.1.2 of
      [RFC5360].  For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
      P-Asserted-Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the
      PUBLISH request is equal to the P-Asserted-Identity header field
      of the request.

P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] (which can only be used in closed network environments) as described in Section 5.6.1.2 of [RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the P-Asserted-Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the PUBLISH request is equal to the P-Asserted-Identity header field of the request.

   Return Routability Test, as described in Section 5.6.1.3 of
      [RFC5360].  It can be used for SIP PUBLISH and HTTP GET requests.
      No authentication is expected to be used with return routability
      tests and, therefore, no identity matching procedures are defined.

Return Routability Test, as described in Section 5.6.1.3 of [RFC5360]. It can be used for SIP PUBLISH and HTTP GET requests. No authentication is expected to be used with return routability tests and, therefore, no identity matching procedures are defined.

   SIP digest, as described in Section 5.6.1.4 of [RFC5360].  The
      identity of the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record
      (AOR) for the user that has authenticated themselves.

SIP digest, as described in Section 5.6.1.4 of [RFC5360]. The identity of the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record (AOR) for the user that has authenticated themselves.

3.1.2.  Identity Condition

3.1.2. Identity Condition

   The identity condition, which is defined in [RFC4745], is matched
   against the URI of the sender of the request that is used as input
   for a translation.

The identity condition, which is defined in [RFC4745], is matched against the URI of the sender of the request that is used as input for a translation.

   When performing a translation, a relay matches the identity condition
   against the identity of the sender of the incoming request.  If they
   match, the identity condition evaluates to TRUE.  Otherwise, the
   identity condition evaluates to FALSE.

When performing a translation, a relay matches the identity condition against the identity of the sender of the incoming request. If they match, the identity condition evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the identity condition evaluates to FALSE.

   Since only authenticated identities can be matched, the following
   subsections define acceptable means of authentication, the procedure
   for representing the identity of the sender as a URI, and the
   procedure for converting an identifier of the form user@domain,
   present in the 'id' attribute of the <one> and <except> elements,
   into a URI.

Since only authenticated identities can be matched, the following subsections define acceptable means of authentication, the procedure for representing the identity of the sender as a URI, and the procedure for converting an identifier of the form user@domain, present in the 'id' attribute of the <one> and <except> elements, into a URI.

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3.1.2.1.  Acceptable Means of Authentication

3.1.2.1. Acceptable Means of Authentication

   When used with SIP, a request sent by a sender is considered
   authenticated if one of the following techniques is used:

When used with SIP, a request sent by a sender is considered authenticated if one of the following techniques is used:

   SIP Digest:  the relay authenticates the sender using SIP digest
      authentication [RFC2617].  However, if the anonymous
      authentication described on page 194 of [RFC3261] is used, the
      sender is not considered authenticated.

SIP Digest: the relay authenticates the sender using SIP digest authentication [RFC2617]. However, if the anonymous authentication described on page 194 of [RFC3261] is used, the sender is not considered authenticated.

   Asserted Identity:  if a request contains a P-Asserted-ID header
      field [RFC3325] and the request is coming from a trusted element,
      the sender is considered authenticated.

Asserted Identity: if a request contains a P-Asserted-ID header field [RFC3325] and the request is coming from a trusted element, the sender is considered authenticated.

   Cryptographically Verified Identity:  if a request contains an
      Identity header field as defined in [RFC4474], and it validates
      the From header field of the request, the request is considered to
      be authenticated.  Note that this is true even if the request
      contained a From header field of the form
      sip:anonymous@example.com.  As long as the signature verifies that
      the request legitimately came from this identity, it is considered
      authenticated.

Cryptographically Verified Identity: if a request contains an Identity header field as defined in [RFC4474], and it validates the From header field of the request, the request is considered to be authenticated. Note that this is true even if the request contained a From header field of the form sip:anonymous@example.com. As long as the signature verifies that the request legitimately came from this identity, it is considered authenticated.

3.1.2.2.  Computing a URI for the Sender

3.1.2.2. Computing a URI for the Sender

   For requests that are authenticated using SIP Digest, the identity of
   the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record (AOR) for the
   user that has authenticated themselves.  For example, consider the
   following "user record" in a database:

For requests that are authenticated using SIP Digest, the identity of the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record (AOR) for the user that has authenticated themselves. For example, consider the following "user record" in a database:

      SIP AOR: sip:alice@example.com
      digest username: ali
      digest password: f779ajvvh8a6s6
      digest realm: example.com

SIP AOR: sip:alice@example.com digest username: ali digest password: f779ajvvh8a6s6 digest realm: example.com

   If the relay receives a request and challenges it with the realm set
   to "example.com", and the subsequent request contains an
   Authorization header field with a username of "ali" and a digest
   response generated with the password "f779ajvvh8a6s6", the identity
   used in matching operations is "sip:alice@example.com".

If the relay receives a request and challenges it with the realm set to "example.com", and the subsequent request contains an Authorization header field with a username of "ali" and a digest response generated with the password "f779ajvvh8a6s6", the identity used in matching operations is "sip:alice@example.com".

   For requests that are authenticated using [RFC3325], the identity of
   the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the P-Asserted-ID header field.
   If there are multiple values for the P-Asserted-ID header field
   (there can be one sip URI and one tel URI [RFC3966]), then each of
   them is used for the comparisons outlined in [RFC4745]; if either of
   them match a <one> or <except> element, it is considered a match.

For requests that are authenticated using [RFC3325], the identity of the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the P-Asserted-ID header field. If there are multiple values for the P-Asserted-ID header field (there can be one sip URI and one tel URI [RFC3966]), then each of them is used for the comparisons outlined in [RFC4745]; if either of them match a <one> or <except> element, it is considered a match.

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   For requests that are authenticated using the SIP Identity mechanism
   [RFC4474], identity of the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the From
   header field of the request, assuming that the signature in the
   Identity header field has been validated.

For requests that are authenticated using the SIP Identity mechanism [RFC4474], identity of the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the From header field of the request, assuming that the signature in the Identity header field has been validated.

   SIP also allows for anonymous requests.  If a request is anonymous
   because the digest challenge/response used the "anonymous" username,
   the request is considered unauthenticated and will not match the
   <identity> condition.  If a request is anonymous because it contains
   a Privacy header field [RFC3323], but still contains a P-Asserted-ID
   header field, the identity in the P-Asserted-ID header field is still
   used in the authorization computations; the fact that the request was
   anonymous has no impact on the identity processing.  However, if the
   request had traversed a trust boundary and the P-Asserted-ID header
   field and the Privacy header field had been removed, the request will
   be considered unauthenticated when it arrives at the relay, and thus
   not match the <sender> condition.  Finally, if a request contained an
   Identity header field that was validated, and the From header field
   contained a URI of the form sip:anonymous@example.com, then the
   sender is considered authenticated, and it will have an identity
   equal to sip:anonymous@example.com.  Had such an identity been placed
   into a <one> or <except> element, there will be a match.

SIP also allows for anonymous requests. If a request is anonymous because the digest challenge/response used the "anonymous" username, the request is considered unauthenticated and will not match the <identity> condition. If a request is anonymous because it contains a Privacy header field [RFC3323], but still contains a P-Asserted-ID header field, the identity in the P-Asserted-ID header field is still used in the authorization computations; the fact that the request was anonymous has no impact on the identity processing. However, if the request had traversed a trust boundary and the P-Asserted-ID header field and the Privacy header field had been removed, the request will be considered unauthenticated when it arrives at the relay, and thus not match the <sender> condition. Finally, if a request contained an Identity header field that was validated, and the From header field contained a URI of the form sip:anonymous@example.com, then the sender is considered authenticated, and it will have an identity equal to sip:anonymous@example.com. Had such an identity been placed into a <one> or <except> element, there will be a match.

3.1.2.3.  Computing a SIP URI from the id Attribute

3.1.2.3. Computing a SIP URI from the id Attribute

   If the <one> or <except> condition does not contain a scheme,
   conversion of the value in the 'id' attribute to a SIP URI is done
   trivially.  If the characters in the 'id' attribute are valid
   characters for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI, a
   'sip:' is appended to the contents of the 'id' attribute, and the
   result is the SIP URI.  If the characters in the 'id' attribute are
   not valid for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI,
   conversion is not possible and, thus, the identity condition
   evaluates to FALSE.  This happens, for example, when the user portion
   of the 'id' attribute contains UTF-8 characters.

If the <one> or <except> condition does not contain a scheme, conversion of the value in the 'id' attribute to a SIP URI is done trivially. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are valid characters for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI, a 'sip:' is appended to the contents of the 'id' attribute, and the result is the SIP URI. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are not valid for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI, conversion is not possible and, thus, the identity condition evaluates to FALSE. This happens, for example, when the user portion of the 'id' attribute contains UTF-8 characters.

3.1.3.  Target Condition

3.1.3. Target Condition

   The target condition is matched against the target URI of a
   translation.  The target condition can contain the same elements and
   attributes as identity conditions.

The target condition is matched against the target URI of a translation. The target condition can contain the same elements and attributes as identity conditions.

   When performing a translation, a relay matches the target condition
   against the destination of the incoming request, which is typically
   contained in the Request-URI.  If they match, the target condition
   evaluates to TRUE.  Otherwise, the target condition evaluates to
   FALSE.

When performing a translation, a relay matches the target condition against the destination of the incoming request, which is typically contained in the Request-URI. If they match, the target condition evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the target condition evaluates to FALSE.

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3.1.4.  Validity Condition

3.1.4. Validity Condition

   The <validity> element is not applicable to this document.  Each
   <permission> element has an infinite lifetime and can be revoked
   using an independent mechanism, as described in Section 5.8 of
   [RFC5360].  In any case, as discussed in Section 4.1 of [RFC5360],
   permissions are only valid as long as the context where they were
   granted is valid.  If present, <validity> elements MUST be ignored.

The <validity> element is not applicable to this document. Each <permission> element has an infinite lifetime and can be revoked using an independent mechanism, as described in Section 5.8 of [RFC5360]. In any case, as discussed in Section 4.1 of [RFC5360], permissions are only valid as long as the context where they were granted is valid. If present, <validity> elements MUST be ignored.

3.1.5.  Sphere Condition

3.1.5. Sphere Condition

   The <sphere> element is not applicable to this document and therefore
   is not used.  If present, <sphere> elements MUST be ignored.

The <sphere> element is not applicable to this document and therefore is not used. If present, <sphere> elements MUST be ignored.

3.2.  Actions

3.2. Actions

   The actions in a permission document provide URIs to grant or deny
   permission to perform the translation described in the document.

The actions in a permission document provide URIs to grant or deny permission to perform the translation described in the document.

      Note that the <trans-handling> element is not an action, as
      defined in Common Policy [RFC4745], but rather an informational
      element.  Therefore, the conflict resolution mechanism does not
      apply to it.

Note that the <trans-handling> element is not an action, as defined in Common Policy [RFC4745], but rather an informational element. Therefore, the conflict resolution mechanism does not apply to it.

   Each policy rule contains at least two <trans-handling> elements; one
   element with a URI to grant and another with a URI to deny
   permission.

Each policy rule contains at least two <trans-handling> elements; one element with a URI to grant and another with a URI to deny permission.

3.2.1.  Translation Handling

3.2.1. Translation Handling

   The <trans-handling> provides URIs for a recipient to grant or deny
   the relay permission to perform a translation.  The defined values
   are:

The <trans-handling> provides URIs for a recipient to grant or deny the relay permission to perform a translation. The defined values are:

   deny:  this action tells the relay not to perform the translation.

deny: this action tells the relay not to perform the translation.

   grant:  this action tells the server to perform the translation.

grant: this action tells the server to perform the translation.

   The 'perm-uri' attribute in the <trans-handling> element provides a
   URI to grant or deny permission to perform a translation.

The 'perm-uri' attribute in the <trans-handling> element provides a URI to grant or deny permission to perform a translation.

4.  Example Document

4. Example Document

   In the following example, a client adds 'sip:bob@example.org' to the
   translation whose target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com'.
   The relay handling the translation generates the following permission
   document in order to ask for permission to relay requests sent to
   'sip:alices-friends@example.com' to 'sip:bob@example.org'.  The

In the following example, a client adds 'sip:bob@example.org' to the translation whose target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com'. The relay handling the translation generates the following permission document in order to ask for permission to relay requests sent to 'sip:alices-friends@example.com' to 'sip:bob@example.org'. The

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   target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com', and the recipient URI
   is 'sip:bob@example.org'.  The sender's identity does not play a role
   in this example.  Therefore, the permission document does not put any
   restriction on potential senders.

target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com', and the recipient URI is 'sip:bob@example.org'. The sender's identity does not play a role in this example. Therefore, the permission document does not put any restriction on potential senders.

  +--------+        +--------------------------------+  Permission
  |        |        |                                |   Request
  | Client |        |             Relay              |    with
  |        |        | sip:alices-friends@example.com |  Permission
  +--------+        |                                |   Document
      |             |+-------+                       |-------------+
      |             ||Transl.|                       |             |
      |Manipulation ||Logic  |                       |             |
      +------------>|+-------+                       |             |
           Add      +--------------------------------+             |
     sip:bob@example.org                                           V
                                                 +---------------------+
                                                 |                     |
                                                 |      Recipient      |
                                                 | sip:bob@example.org |
                                                 |                     |
                                                 +---------------------+

+--------+ +--------------------------------+ Permission | | | | Request | Client | | Relay | with | | | sip:alices-friends@example.com | Permission +--------+ | | Document | |+-------+ |-------------+ | ||Transl.| | | |Manipulation ||Logic | | | +------------>|+-------+ | | Add +--------------------------------+ | sip:bob@example.org V +---------------------+ | | | Recipient | | sip:bob@example.org | | | +---------------------+

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  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
         <cp:ruleset
             xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
             xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
             <cp:rule id="f1">
          <cp:conditions>
              <cp:identity>
                  <cp:many/>
              </cp:identity>
              <recipient>
                  <cp:one id="sip:bob@example.org"/>
              </recipient>
              <target>
                  <cp:one id="sip:alices-friends@example.com"/>
              </target>
          </cp:conditions>
          <cp:actions>
              <trans-handling
                  perm-uri="sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com"
                  >grant</trans-handling>
              <trans-handling
                  perm-uri="https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34"
                  >grant</trans-handling>
              <trans-handling
                  perm-uri="sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com"
                  >deny</trans-handling>
              <trans-handling
                  perm-uri="https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye"
                  >deny</trans-handling>
          </cp:actions>
          <cp:transformations/>
      </cp:rule>
      </cp:ruleset>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <cp:ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"> <cp:rule id="f1"> <cp:conditions> <cp:identity> <cp:many/> </cp:identity> <recipient> <cp:one id="sip:bob@example.org"/> </recipient> <target> <cp:one id="sip:alices-friends@example.com"/> </target> </cp:conditions> <cp:actions> <trans-handling perm-uri="sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com" >grant</trans-handling> <trans-handling perm-uri="https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34" >grant</trans-handling> <trans-handling perm-uri="sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com" >deny</trans-handling> <trans-handling perm-uri="https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye" >deny</trans-handling> </cp:actions> <cp:transformations/> </cp:rule> </cp:ruleset>

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5.  XML Schema

5. XML Schema

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
      <xs:schema
        targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
        xmlns:cr="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
        xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
        xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
        elementFormDefault="qualified"
        attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <xs:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" xmlns:cr="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

        <!-- Conditions -->
        <xs:element name="recipient" type="cp:identityType"/>
        <xs:element name="target" type="cp:identityType"/>

<!-- Conditions --> <xs:element name="recipient" type="cp:identityType"/> <xs:element name="target" type="cp:identityType"/>

       <!-- Actions -->
       <xs:simpleType name="trans-values">
          <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
            <xs:enumeration value="deny"/>
            <xs:enumeration value="grant"/>
          </xs:restriction>
        </xs:simpleType>

<!-- Actions --> <xs:simpleType name="trans-values"> <xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:enumeration value="deny"/> <xs:enumeration value="grant"/> </xs:restriction> </xs:simpleType>

        <xs:element name="trans-handling">
          <xs:complexType>
            <xs:simpleContent>
              <xs:extension base="trans-values">
                <xs:attribute name="perm-uri" type="xs:anyURI"
                              use="required"/>
              </xs:extension>
            </xs:simpleContent>
          </xs:complexType>
        </xs:element>

<xs:element name="trans-handling"> <xs:complexType> <xs:simpleContent> <xs:extension base="trans-values"> <xs:attribute name="perm-uri" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> </xs:extension> </xs:simpleContent> </xs:complexType> </xs:element>

      </xs:schema>

</xs:schema>

6.  Extensibility

6. Extensibility

   This specification defines elements that do not have extension points
   in the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace.  Instance
   documents that utilize these element definitions SHOULD be schema
   valid.  Applications processing instance documents with content that
   is not understood by the application MUST ignore that content.  IETF
   extension documents of this specification MAY reuse the
   "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace to define new
   elements.

This specification defines elements that do not have extension points in the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace. Instance documents that utilize these element definitions SHOULD be schema valid. Applications processing instance documents with content that is not understood by the application MUST ignore that content. IETF extension documents of this specification MAY reuse the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace to define new elements.

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7.  IANA Considerations

7. IANA Considerations

   This section registers a new XML namespace and a new XML schema per
   the procedures in [RFC3688].

This section registers a new XML namespace and a new XML schema per the procedures in [RFC3688].

7.1.  XML Namespace Registration

7.1. XML Namespace Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules

   Registrant Contact:  IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
      Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>

Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>, Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>

  XML:

XML:

     BEGIN
     <?xml version="1.0"?>
     <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
       "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
     <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
     <head>
       <meta http-equiv="content-type"
             content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
       <title>Consent Rules Namespace</title>
     </head>
     <body>
       <h1>Namespace for Permission Documents</h1>
       <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules</h2>
     <p>See <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5361.txt">RFC 5361
       </a>.</p>
     </body>
     </html>
     END

BEGIN <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/> <title>Consent Rules Namespace</title> </head> <body> <h1>Namespace for Permission Documents</h1> <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules</h2> <p>See <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5361.txt">RFC 5361 </a>.</p> </body> </html> END

7.2.  XML Schema Registration

7.2. XML Schema Registration

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:consent-rules

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:consent-rules

   Registrant Contact:  IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
      Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>

Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>, Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>

   XML:  The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 5.

XML: The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 5.

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8.  Security Considerations

8. Security Considerations

   RFC 5360 [RFC5360] discusses security-related issues, such as how to
   authenticate SIP and HTTP requests granting permissions and how to
   transport permission documents between relays and recipients, that
   are directly related to this specification.

RFC 5360 [RFC5360] discusses security-related issues, such as how to authenticate SIP and HTTP requests granting permissions and how to transport permission documents between relays and recipients, that are directly related to this specification.

9.  Acknowledgements

9. Acknowledgements

   Jonathan Rosenberg provided useful ideas on this document.  Hannes
   Tschofenig helped align this document with common policy.  Ben
   Campbell and Mary Barnes performed a thorough review of this
   document.  Lakshminath Dondeti provided useful comments.

Jonathan Rosenberg provided useful ideas on this document. Hannes Tschofenig helped align this document with common policy. Ben Campbell and Mary Barnes performed a thorough review of this document. Lakshminath Dondeti provided useful comments.

10.  References

10. 参照

10.1.  Normative References

10.1. 引用規格

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2119] ブラドナー、S.、「Indicate Requirement LevelsへのRFCsにおける使用のためのキーワード」、BCP14、RFC2119、1997年3月。

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

[RFC2617] フランクス、J.、ハラム-ベイカー、P.、Hostetler、J.、ローレンス、S.、リーチ、P.、Luotonen、A.、およびL.スチュワート、「HTTP認証:」 「基本的、そして、ダイジェストアクセス認証」、RFC2617、1999年6月。

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

[RFC3261] ローゼンバーグ、J.、Schulzrinne、H.、キャマリロ、G.、ジョンストン、A.、ピーターソン、J.、スパークス、R.、ハンドレー、M.、およびE.学生は「以下をちびちび飲みます」。 「セッション開始プロトコル」、RFC3261、2002年6月。

   [RFC3323]  Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, November 2002.

[RFC3323] ピーターソン、J.、「セッション開始プロトコル(一口)のためのプライバシーメカニズム」、RFC3323、2002年11月。

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

[RFC3688] 食事、M.、「IETF XML登録」、BCP81、RFC3688、2004年1月。

   [RFC4474]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.

[RFC4474] ピーターソン、J.、およびC.ジョニングス、「セッション開始における認証されたアイデンティティ管理のための増進は(一口)について議定書の中で述べます」、RFC4474、2006年8月。

   [RFC4745]  Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
              Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
              Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
              February 2007.

[RFC4745] Schulzrinne、H.、Tschofenig、H.、モリス、J.、クエリャル、J.、ポーク、J.、およびJ.ローゼンバーグ、「共通政策:」 「プライバシー好みを言い表すためのドキュメント・フォーマット」、RFC4745、2007年2月。

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   [RFC5360]  Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "A Framework
              for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5360, October 2008.

[RFC5360] ローゼンバーグ、J.、キャマリロ、G.、およびD.ウィリス、「セッション開始プロトコル(一口)の同意ベースのコミュニケーションのための枠組み」、RFC5360(2008年10月)。

10.2.  Informative References

10.2. 有益な参照

   [RFC3966]  Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
              RFC 3966, December 2004.

[RFC3966]Schulzrinne、2004年12月のH.、「Telephone民数記のためのtel URI」RFC3966。

   [RFC3325]  Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
              Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
              Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
              November 2002.

[RFC3325] ジョニングス、C.、ピーターソン、J.、およびM.ワトソン、「セッション開始への個人的な拡大は断言されたアイデンティティのために信じられたネットワークの中で(一口)について議定書の中で述べます」、RFC3325、2002年11月。

Author's Address

作者のアドレス

   Gonzalo Camarillo
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

ゴンサロキャマリロエリクソンHirsalantie11Jorvas02420フィンランド

   EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com

メール: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com

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Full Copyright Statement

完全な著作権宣言文

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

IETFが信じる著作権(C)(2008)。

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

このドキュメントはBCP78に含まれた権利、ライセンス、および制限を受けることがあります、そして、そこに詳しく説明されるのを除いて、作者は彼らのすべての権利を保有します。

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

このドキュメントとここに含まれた情報はその人が代理をするか、または(もしあれば)後援される組織、インターネットの振興発展を目的とする組織、「そのままで」という基礎と貢献者の上で提供していて、IETFはそして、インターネット・エンジニアリング・タスク・フォースがすべての保証を放棄すると信じます、急行である、または暗示していて、他を含んでいて、情報の使用がここに侵害しないどんな保証も少しもまっすぐになるということであるかいずれが市場性か特定目的への適合性の黙示的な保証です。

Intellectual Property

知的所有権

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

IETFはどんなIntellectual Property Rightsの正当性か範囲、実現に関係すると主張されるかもしれない他の権利、本書では説明された技術の使用またはそのような権利の下におけるどんなライセンスも利用可能であるかもしれない、または利用可能でないかもしれない範囲に関しても立場を全く取りません。 または、それはそれを表しません。どんなそのような権利も特定するためのどんな独立している努力もしました。 BCP78とBCP79でRFCドキュメントの権利に関する手順に関する情報を見つけることができます。

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

IPR公開のコピーが利用可能に作られるべきライセンスの保証、または一般的な免許を取得するのが作られた試みの結果をIETF事務局といずれにもしたか、または http://www.ietf.org/ipr のIETFのオンラインIPR倉庫からこの仕様のimplementersかユーザによるそのような所有権の使用のために許可を得ることができます。

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

IETFはこの規格を実行するのに必要であるかもしれない技術をカバーするかもしれないどんな著作権もその注目していただくどんな利害関係者、特許、特許出願、または他の所有権も招待します。 ietf-ipr@ietf.org のIETFに情報を記述してください。

Camarillo                   Standards Track                    [Page 14]

キャマリロ標準化過程[14ページ]

一覧

 RFC 1〜100  RFC 1401〜1500  RFC 2801〜2900  RFC 4201〜4300 
 RFC 101〜200  RFC 1501〜1600  RFC 2901〜3000  RFC 4301〜4400 
 RFC 201〜300  RFC 1601〜1700  RFC 3001〜3100  RFC 4401〜4500 
 RFC 301〜400  RFC 1701〜1800  RFC 3101〜3200  RFC 4501〜4600 
 RFC 401〜500  RFC 1801〜1900  RFC 3201〜3300  RFC 4601〜4700 
 RFC 501〜600  RFC 1901〜2000  RFC 3301〜3400  RFC 4701〜4800 
 RFC 601〜700  RFC 2001〜2100  RFC 3401〜3500  RFC 4801〜4900 
 RFC 701〜800  RFC 2101〜2200  RFC 3501〜3600  RFC 4901〜5000 
 RFC 801〜900  RFC 2201〜2300  RFC 3601〜3700  RFC 5001〜5100 
 RFC 901〜1000  RFC 2301〜2400  RFC 3701〜3800  RFC 5101〜5200 
 RFC 1001〜1100  RFC 2401〜2500  RFC 3801〜3900  RFC 5201〜5300 
 RFC 1101〜1200  RFC 2501〜2600  RFC 3901〜4000  RFC 5301〜5400 
 RFC 1201〜1300  RFC 2601〜2700  RFC 4001〜4100  RFC 5401〜5500 
 RFC 1301〜1400  RFC 2701〜2800  RFC 4101〜4200 

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